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ABSTRACT

Previous research and discussion has suggested that task ambigu
ity and experimenter-subject familiarity with the task are important
factors affecting the generality and strength of the experimenter bias
effect.

These factors were conceptualized as inter-task ambiguity

(inherent in the task) and two types of intra-task ambiguity (experi
menter's familiarity with the task and subject's familiarity with the
task).

It was hypothesized that experimenter bias would:

(1) be a

significant factor in a more ambiguous task and not a significant fac
tor in a less ambiguous task, (2) more likely be communicated to the
subjects who were less familiar with the task, and (3) more likely be
communicated to the subjects as the experimenters became more familiar
with the task.
Nine upperclassmen experimenters were randomly assigned to one
of three bias level, high, medium, and low (expect +5, 0, or -5 mean
ratings on the person perception task).

Each experimenter tested 10

subjects (female volunteers from introductory psychology) in a random
order.

Five subjects rated high ambiguity photos (mean ratings near

0 on the success-failure dimension under a no-expectancy condition)
and five viewed low ambiguity photos (mean ratings high in the success
direction under the no-expectancy condition).
Five analyses of variance were computed; a significant experi
menter bias effect was found with the high ambiguity stimilus photos
but not with the low ambiguity photos.
viii

However, the bias levels were

not communicated in the predicted order.

The high and low expectancy

experimenters were both significantly higher than the medium bias expe
rimenters.

The hypotheses pertaining to intra-task ambiguity were not

supported by the data.
From this study one can conclude that the experimenter bias
effect is a function of ambiguity inherent in the task.

The role of

intra-task ambiguity is less clear and no conclusion can be stated
based on the present data.

ix

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The last 10 years have seen a marked rise of interest in the
role of the experimenter in psychological research.

Psychologists

have only recently begun to take cognizance of experimenter-subject
interaction in the social setting of psychological research.
(1963) in an article entitled "The Experimenter:

McGuigan

A Neglected Stimulus

Object" discussed this problem and made a strong case for putting the
experimenter back in the experimenter-subject interaction.
Experimenters seemingly have accepted research findings without
due regard to the dangers of what Merton (1948) has called "selffulfilling phophecy."

Merton discussed the phenomena of self-fulfilling

prophecy in relation to minority group stereotypes more than psychologi
cal research per se, but the conceptualization is readily applicable
to the latter.

He saw researchers and the general public as sometimes

intentionally, but more often unintentionally affecting situations so
that they come to reflect the a_ priori hypotheses or prophecies of the
person.

Merton strikingly illustrated this point with an anecdote about

bank failure.

Depositors in a solvent bank caused the bank's failure

through a mistaken belief in its lack of solvency.
Orne (1962) has discussed at length the problems that have
developed in the social sciences from using the basic research paradigm
developed to deal with phenomena in the physical sciences.
1

The problem
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derives from the fact that the physical sciences deal with inanimate
objects— passive responders.

In the social sciences the objects are

anything but inanimate passive responders.

Orne stated that the sub

jects' motives in the experimental situation, his perception of the expe
imental situation, and what he is responding to have often been ignored
or taken for granted in social science research.

Orne discussed the

usual subject in psychological research as being the "good" subject who
works to please the researcher.

The "good" subject sees his task as

finding out what the experimenter "really" wants and following through
so as not to upset the experimenter or give him unsatisfactory results.
The totality of cues which might convey the experimental hypothesis
to the subject are termed the "demand characteristics" of the situation
by Orne.

These demand characteristics include rumors about the research

the person of the experimenter, the laboratory setting, and more impor
tant for the purposes of this study, explicit and implicit communication
between the experimenter and the subject during the experiment.

Where

the "good" inanimate subject responds ideally to only the experimental
variables, the animate "good" subject responds to the demand character
istics of the situation as well as the experimental variables.
Orne and Scheibe (1964) and Raffetto (1967) investigated the
role of the demand characteristics of the situation in the sensory
deprivation effect.

Orne and Scheibe found significantly more reports

of hallucinatory experiences and the other usual sensor;.' deprivation
effects when a "panic button" was available to the subjects and when
the research was carried out in a medical setting wcLth an "emergency
tray" present.

Raffetto found more reports of hallucinatory experiences
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from the subjects when the experimenters expected them than when the
experimenters did not expect them.

Seemingly the experimenters'

expectancies were covertly being communicated to the subjects and the
subjects were responding accordingly in the Raffetto study.

The two

studies successfully showed that the sensory deprivation effect may in
part be due to the subjects responding to the demand characteristics
of the situation and not to sensory deprivation per se.
The demand characteristics of the situation are the totality
of cues available to the subjects.

The focus of this study is the

experimenter and his interaction with the subject.

The focus is upon

the experimenter as in the Raffetto (1967) study more than upon the
physical aspects of the situation as in the Orne and Scheibe (1964)
s tudy.
The experimenter variables have been divided into two broad
classes by Barber and Silver (1968a) and Rosenthal (1966).

The first

class of experimenter variables are the essentially inherent aspects
of the experimenter such as age, sex, race, status, ethnic character
istics and personality traits.

These aspects of the experimenter have

been conceptualized as part of the experimenter personal attributes
effect by Barber and Silver and simply the experimenter effect by
Rosenthal.

These variables, while important in the experimenter-

subject interaction, are of only indirect interest as control variables
in this study.

The second class of experimenter variables have been

conceptualized by Barber and Silver and Rosenthal as the experimenter
bias effect.
imenter

This effect has at various times been called the exper

outcome-orientation effect, the experimenter expectancy effect,
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the "Clever Hans Phenomenon," as well as the experimenter bias effect
by Rosenthal (Barber & Silver, 1968a).

This effect is conceptualized

as being produced by the expectancies, desires or biases of the experi
menter.
In almost all psychological research the experimenter expects
or hopes for different responses from different subjects or groups of
subjects.

The experimenter rarely takes specific measures to preclude

implicit communication of these a priori hypotheses and expectations
to the subjects.

If research hypotheses or expectations are easily and

often implicitly communicated to subjects, the results of much psycholog
ical research are open to question.

The generality of the experimenter

bias effect is a very important question for future research as well as
for the evaluation of past research.
The focus of this paper is on the role of task variables, spe
cifically the ambiguity of the task, in the occurrence and magnitude
of the experimenter bias effect.

Intuitively, the more ambiguous the

task, the more likely the experimenters' biases will be a factor in
determining the subjects' responses.

CHAPTER II

HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The literature pertaining to unintended experimenter effects
is very rich and diverse.

Indirectly relevant information could be

included from many areas.

The literature review will be limited as

much as possible, to directly relevant studies which utilize standard
ized treatment and assessment procedures.

This has the effect of

reducing the scope of this study to the experimenter bias effect as
discussed and investigated by Rosenthal (1966).

Studies not based on

this paradigm are to be included only if directly relevant to the
emphasis on task variables.
The concept of unintended experimenter effects broadly defined
has been of major interest to clinicians and psychotherapists (Goldstein,
1962; Troffer and Tart, 1964), educators (Rosenthal and Jacobson, 1968)
and survey interviewers (Ferber and Wales, 1952).

Typically, researchers

in these areas have not used standardized procedures.

In the Rosenthal

and Jacobson (1968) study, for instance, elementary school teachers were
led to believe that certain students had unusual potential for intellec
tual growth while others were only average.

Standard treatment proce

dures were lacking in that the teachers were permitted to treat the
children differently.
Several additional lengthy reviews of the general literature
dealing with unintentional experimenter effects are available.
5

These
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include a book-length treatment by Friedman (1967) , a lengthy doctoral
dissertation by Fode (1967), a journal review by Kintz, Delprato, Mettee,
Persons and Schappe (1965), and numerous journal articles by Rosenthal
(1963, 1964a, 1964b, 1967a, 1969).

The prime source in the area is a

book entitled "Experimenter Effects in Behavioral Research" by Rosenthal
(1966).

Recent more specialized review articles in the area include

one by Silver (1968) on experimenter modeling and one by Glixman (1967)
on effects of examiner, examiner-sex and subject sex upon categorizing
behavior.
Seemingly the earliest study dealing specifically with unintended
experimenter effects in a straightforward experimental task was one done
by Stanton and Baker in 1942.

Stanton and Baker presented 12 nonsense

geometric figures to 200 undergraduate subjects.

Retention of these

figures was measured by five experienced workers some time after the
presentation session.

The experimenters were given keys which contained

correct responses but also some incorrect responses.

The experimenters

were explicitly warned to avoid any bias associated with having the keys
before them while interviewing the subjects.

Stanton and Baker found

that what the subjects retained tended to be in agreement with what the
experimenters believed to be correct.

The subjects significantly more

often gave correct responses when the experimenter had the correct key
than when the experimenter's key was incorrect.
Lindzey (1951) replicated the Stanton and Baker study, but empha
sized to his experimenters to keep the key out of sight from the subjects.
The results failed to confirm the Baker and Stanton findings.

Friedman

(1942) also failed to obtain the statistical significance obtained in the
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original study.

Stanton (1942) strengthened the conclusions stated in

the original Stanton and Baker (1942) study.

The responses expected by

experimenters were found more often than expected by chance.

Seemingly,

the experimenters were cueing the subjects to what was expected or record
ing what they expected to hear in the subject's responses.
Most of the recent work on unintended experimenter effects has
been based on Rosenthal's (1966) person-perception task.

The subject

is shown a series of photographed faces and is asked to rate each on a
scale ranging from -10 to +10 whether the person has been experiencing
failure or success.

The subject is instructed to rate a +10 for extreme

success and a -10 for extreme failure with intermediate labeled points.
The photographs were originally standardized by administering them under
a "no-expectancy condition" to a large sample of undergraduate students.
The photographs selected for presentation to the experimental groups
averaged near zero under the no-expectancy condition.
subjects and experimenters were students.

Typically the

Before seeing the student

subjects, the student experimenters were usually told to expect subject
ratings to average +5 or -5.

The student experimenters were also led

to believe that they were replicating "well established findings."
In the first experiment based on this paradigm (Rosenthal, 1966)
10 advanced undergraduates and graduate students of psychology served
as experimenters.

Each student experimenter was assigned about 20 sub

jects from an introduction to psychology course.

The 10 photos used

as stimulus items had a mean no-expectancy rating near zero.

Half the

student experimenters were told that people generally rated the photos
as moderately successful (ratings of +5) and half the experimenters were
told that people generally rated the photos as moderately unsuccessful
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(ratings of -5).

The rest of the instructions given to the experimenters

were the same for both groups.

They were given identical instructions

to read to their subjects and all were cautioned not to deviate from
these instructions.

The experimenters were told that they were partici

pating in the study to see how well they could duplicate "well established
findings."
According to Rosenthal (1966) and Rosenthal and Jacobson (1968)
the results were clear.

The experimenters that expected higher average

ratings found significantly higher average ratings.
were conducted which confirmed the original findings.

Two replications
The experimenters

tended to obtain the results that they expected to obtain.
Subsequent research reported by Rosenthal (1966) and his asso
ciates dealt with the generality of the phenomena, mediating variables,
and parametric studies involving experimenter variables.

The results

seemed clear to Rosenthal (1963) as he stated that the experimenter
expectancy effect is "both a fairly general and fairly robust phenom
enon" (p. 271).
Rosenthal and Jacobson (1968) in discussing the individual dif
ferences among experimenters stated:
Those experimenters who show greater self-fulfilling effects
of prophecies tend to be of higher status in the eyes of their
subjects, and they conduct their experiments in a more profes
sional, more competent manner. They are more likeable and more
relaxed, particularly in their movement patterns, while avoiding
an overly personal tone of voice that might interfere with the
business at hand (p. 28).
Friedman, Kurland, and Rosenthal (1965) also discussed what they called
"professionalness" as a factor in experimenter bias communication.

The

Friedman, Kurland and Rosenthal article was based on the examination of
moving pictures of experimenter-subject interactions.
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Rosenthal's statements about the generality of experimenter bias
have recently been criticized in a series of articles by Barber and bis
associates (Barber, 1969; Barber & Silver, 1968a, 1968b; Barber, Calverly, Forgione, McPeake, Chavis, & Bowen, 1969).

Barber and bis asso

ciates criticized the earlier studies in the area on the basis of the
statistical analyses used.

They pointed out that many of the studies

(seemingly the majority of them) did not clearly demonstrate the exper
imenter bias effect.

The faults in the analyses of results included

failure to perform an overall statistical analysis to exclude the null
hypothesis and failure to avoid "probability pyramiding" when postmortem
tests were performed.

Barber and Silver (1968a) concluded that "the

experimenter bias effect appears to be more difficult to demonstrate
and less pervasive than was implied" (p. 23).

They also felt that in

some studies purporting to show the effect the student experimenters
misjudged, misrecorded or misreported the results.

Some studies they

analyzed did show the experimenter bias effect, however.
Rosenthal (1968) defended his earlier conclusions.

The defense

was based on combining the probabilities from 12 studies which showed
the experimenter bias effect.
1/1,000,000.

The combined probability was less than

Rosenthal held that analyzing results of single experi

ments as Barber and his associates had done was a misleading procedure.
He stated that the studies should be viewed as a run of experiments and
the combined probability for the 12 studies was only 1/1,000,000 that
the results were a chance happening.
Rosenthal (1969) also criticized the Barber et al. (1969) fail
ures to replicate the findings of the earlier Rosenthal studies.
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Rosenthal felt that the Barber _et_ al. studies could not be regarded as
serious attempts to replicate because of differences in experimenters
and subjects from his studies.
Other recent studies based on the Rosenthal paradigm have also
failed to replicate the original findings.

Jacob (1968) included a

zero expectancy control group and directly probed the subjects' per
ception of the experimenters' expectancies.

The overall

based on

the subjects' mean ratings of the photos was not significant (J?<1.0).
The +5 subjects, when directly asked, thought that their experimenters
expected a mean of .38, the -5 subjects a mean of 1.17, and the zero
expectancy control group thought that their experimenters expected a
mean of 3.04.

The _t between the +5 group prediction of experimenter

expectancy and the zero group was significant; the other jts were not
significant.

Jacob concluded:

"Coupled with the Barber and Silver

conclusions (Barber & Silver, 1968a), the present findings indicates
that assuming the stability of the effect and focusing on particular
modes of mediation is rather premature, and it is suggested that sub
sequent research be directed toward specification of conditions under
which the effect actually emerges" (p. 240).

Another recent study

(Kennedy, 1969) also failed to detect the Rosenthal effect in a verbal
conditioning task.

Kennedy's experimenters were given more extended

pretask indoctrination than is usual; the author thought that this
might have been a factor that attenuated the effect.

Verbal Mediation
Verbal communication seems very important in the experimenter
bias effect.

Adair and Epstein (1968) and Epstein (1966) reported on
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a study in which verbal cues alone were sufficient for communication
of the experimenters' expectations.

Six male student experimenters

administered the basic person-perception task to 60 female student
subjects.

Each experimenter ran five subjects under the low expect

ancy (-5) condition and five under the high expectancy (+5) condition.
The reading of the instructions was tape recorded during theses sessions
and 60 more female subjects run using only the tape recorded voice as
the experimenter.

A significant experimenter bias effect was found in

both the visual and non-visual situations.

The voice of the experi

menter reading the instructions seemingly was enough to communicate the
expectancies to the subjects.
Fode (1960, Rosenthal & Fode, 1963) also indicated the great
importance of verbal cues in experimenter bias communication.

Fode

restricted experimenter-subject visual contact in one group and the
experimenters' verbal communication in a second group and compared
the subjects' performance in these groups with conditions in which
there were no restrictions.

Fode concluded that while verbal cues

are sufficient to mediate experimenter bias, visual cues increased the
effect.

Intra-task and Inter-task Ambiguity
Ambiguity can be conceptualized as being of two kinds.

The

first type, intra-task ambiguity, refers to differences in ambiguity
in one task over time.

For example, a task completely new to an exper

imenter and subject would be more ambiguous than a very familiar task.
As the initially unfamiliar task becomes more familiar over the course
of the study the ambiguity would decrease.

Intra-task ambiguity for a
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subject would be less on later pictures in the person-perception task
than on earlier pictures.

For the experimenter intra-task ambiguity

would be less with subjects seen later in the study than with subjects
seen earlier in the study. .
Inter-task ambiguity refers to characteristics of the task
itself.

Some tasks are just more ambiguous than others.

Riecken (1962)

suggested that there are two general types of experimental tasks "that
provide subjects with different kinds of hints as to how to put their
best foot forward, or, in effect, urge subjects to adopt one or another
'set' toward the experiment" (p. 35).
and the other "self-quality."

He called one type "task ability"

Riecken stated that:

A "task-ability" set is characteristically adopted when the
experimenter presents the work to be done as involving some
ability, skill or capacity to perform. The task may be motor
or mental, simple or complex, familiar or strange, e.g. estimat
ing the number of dots on a card, judging "auto-kinetic" move
ment distances, judging the personality of another or solving
"human relations problems." The outstanding feature of such
assignments is that there is no upper limit on the amount of
skill or capacity the subject "ought" to display (p. 35).
In task-ability problems the positively valued end of the ability con
tinuum is generally known to the subjects.

The subject usually works

to his limit in the task; it is impossible for him to do more than his
best.

The subject can misrepresent his performance in only one direc

tion and that is to do less than he is capable of doing.
The self-quality problems are quite different according to
Riecken.

They "can be characterized in general as being concerned with

opinions and beliefs; with responses to frustration, insult, and failure;
with conformity-independence, choice-rejection or others; or with qual
ities such as dogmatism, authoritarianism, punitiveness and the like"
(p. 35).

In general the self-quality tasks are more open-ended, more
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ambiguous than the task-quality problems according to Riecken.

The

task-quality problems involve one dimension of "good-bad" performance
while the self-quality problems "tend to have two bad extremes and a
good point located somewhere between the extremes, though not neces
sarily in the 'middle'" (p. 36).

In order to be a "good" subject in

a self-quality task the "subject must either draw from his pool of
common sense knowledge about what 'anybody knows' . . .

or . . .

he

would have to know the scheme of relevance that the experimenter is
employing:

the hypothesis being tested, the categories into which

the behavior will be placed, the criteria for such placement, and the
value assigned to category" (p. 36).

Generally the experimenter con

ceals this information from the subject and this tends to "maximize
the negotiation" between subject and experimenter.

The person-

perception task generally used in the area of experimenter bias would
be considered a self-quality situation.

Intra-task Ambiguity
The experimenter's experience with a particular task seems to
be a relevant variable in the experimenter's performance.

Brogden

(1962) reported that naive experimenters differed in the speed with
which they conditioned rabbits but that the initial differences dis
appeared as the experimenters became more experienced.

Cordaro and

Ison (1963) in a study of observer bias in classical conditioning of
the planaria stated that while a significant bias effect was found,
it was to be attributed to experimenters using different response
criteria.

The experimenters were given little information as to when

a response shjould be recorded as a response.

Shinkman and Kornblith
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(1965) suggested that the degree of observer bias is not as great with
more experienced

experimenters.

Rosenthal and Halas (1962) reported

that even experienced researchers showed significant differences when
asked to record turning responses and contraction responses in planaria
under a no-false expectancy condition.

However, the "experienced"

researchers in the Rosenthal and Halas study were not particularly
experienced in the area of observing planarian behavior.

The differ

ences may have been less if the response criteria had been more strin
gently defined and the experimenters had been given more training.

The

task of planaria observing may be just too ambiguous for human observers
to perform reliably.

Cordaro and Ison (1963) suggested that cameras be

used to more objectively record planarian responses.
Ingraham and Harrington (1966) required 27 initially naive
experimenters to condition "dull" and "bright" rats in a bar-press
task.

The rats were actually randomly assigned to the student exper

imenters.

The authors reported no significant overall experimenter

bias effect but found evidence to indicate that early trials showed
some bias effect.

They concluded that the bias present was an initial

response and not a continuing response in a decreasingly ambiguous
situation.

Other factors pointed out as possibly having a role in

attenuating the experimenter bias effect were the relatively long
experimenter pretraining period and the fact that the experimenters
were given mixed expectancies.

The individual experimenters were

led to expect different performances from different rats.

Ingraham

and Harrington suggested that bias is more often shown where the
experimenter is given only one expectancy instead of mixed expectancies.
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Rosenthal (1967b, 1967c) reanalyzed the data from the Ingraham
and Harrington (1966) study and suggested that the results did demon
strate experimenter bias.

The authors responded (Harrington, 1967; Har

rington & Ingraham, 1967) to Rosenthal's criticisms.

They defended their

original conclusions and questioned Rosenthal's analysis of the data.
They restated their original conclusion that the bias shown was an initial
but not a continuing response in a decreasingly ambiguous situation.
Two studies based on the person-perception task indicate that
the bias effect is operating on the earliest photos of a subject's
trials.

Rosenthal, Fode, Vikan-Kline, and Persinger (1964) looked at

the temporal aspects of bias communication in three earlier studies.

In

general, they found that the magnitude of the expectancy effect was some
what greater for the first photo alone, than for all ten photos combined.
The subjects seemed to be somewhat more affected by the experimenters'
bias on earlier trials when the task was relatively unfamiliar than on
later trials when the task was more familiar.

The tendency for the

experimenter bias effect to decrease over the series of photos was more
strikingly shown, in a study by Weick reported by Rosenthal (1966) .

Weiclc

required two experimenters to administer the person-perception photo
rating task to 10 introductory psychology students.

One of the experi

menters presented the cards to five subjects under a high bias expect
ancy and the second experimenter saw the other five students under a low
bias expectancy.

The experiment was conducted in front of Weick's class

in experimental social psychology.

The subjects rated the photos dif

ferently (_t = 2.93, £ = .01, one-tail) in line with the experimenters'
biases, but the first responses were more affected than were the sub
sequent responses.

The bias effect was significant on the very first
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photo but diminished significantly

= .08) for the last 10 photos of

the standard 20-photo set.
In the Weick study, the effect of subjects' intra-task ambigu
ity, conceptualized as familiarity, is clearly shown.

As the ambiguity

of the task decreased through increasing familiarity, the subjects
showed significantly less experimenter bias effect.

The mean ratings

of the subjects being tested by the high bias experimenter tended to
approach the mean ratings of the subjects being tested by the low bias
experimenter.
There is very little research that is directly relevant to the
question of the role of the experimenter's experience in the communi
cation of the experimenter's expectancies involving the person-perception
task.

Vikan-Kline (1962) in an investigation of the effect of the exper

imenter's perceived status on the mediation of experimenter bias found
no order effect among her lower status experimenters but did find an
order effect among her higher status experimenters.

The higher status

experimenters showed a significant tendency (g_ = .01) to influence sub
jects seen later in the study more than subjects seen earlier in the
study.

Rosenthal (1966) discussed the effect as learning to communi

cate unintentionally.

He concluded that "although the evidence is not

conclusive, it does seem that, on the whole, later-contacted subjects
are more influenced by the experimenter's expectancy than earliercontacted subjects" (p. 301-302).

Inter-task Ambiguity
Many authors have suggested that the ambiguity of the task is
an important factor controlling the generality of the experimenter bias
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effect.
...

As Barber and Silver (1968a) put it:

"The hypothesis suggested

is that the effects of experimenter's expectancies on the results

of his research vary directly with the ambiguity, lack of structure, or
non-factualness of the experimental task.
test this hypothesis" (p. 26).
importance of task ambiguity:

Further research is needed to

Masling (1966) strongly emphasized the
"The stimulus variable is crucial.

The

more clearly the stimulus can be perceived, the less opportunity for pro
jecting experimenter or S (subject) bias" (p. 92}, Shames and Adair (1967)
also discussed task ambiguity:

"the type of task is a critical factor

limiting the generality of experimenter-bias effects" (p. 6).
has also been discussed in the context of interviewer bias.

Ambiguity
Ferber and

Wales stated that "interviewer bias is more likely to crop up on attitudinal questions than on questions of fact" (1952, p. 116).
While many persons have talked about the role of ambiguity in
experimenter bias, few studies have dealt with ambiguity per se.

As

one would expect, however, those tasks that are more fact oriented seem
not to show the experimenter bias effect as often as the more attitudeoriented tasks.
Ekren (1962) studied the effect of experimenter bias on a rela
tively unambiguous task, the block design segment of the Wechsler Adult
Intelligence Scale.

The block design task would be of the fact-

oriented type (Ferber & Wales, 1952) or the task-ability type (Riecken,
1962).

No significant experimenter bias effect was found.

Pflugrath

(1962) found no overall significant experimenter bias effect in a stan
dardized paper and pencil test, the Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale.

The

scale was administered to groups of subjects, however, so experimentersubject interaction was minimal.

Pflugrath concluded that "Examiner bias
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in the group testing situation is probably not a particularly robust
phenomenon" (p. 33).

The questions on the Taylor Manifest Anxiety

Scale tend to be of the fact-oriented type; the bias effect may be a
factor only in individual testing situations, if at all.
The ink-blot projective tests seem to serve as ready vehicles
for the demonstration of experimenter bias.

Masling (1965) required

14 graduate student volunteers for a quick course in Rorschach technique
to administer the cards to undergraduates.
to expect different results.

The experimenters were led

Half were told that experienced experimenter

found more human than animal responses on the Rorschach task; the other
seven experimenters were told the opposite— experienced experimenters
found more animal than human responses.
the induced expectancies.

The data were in agreement *tfith

Marwit and Marcia (1967) based their study on

achromatic reproductions of Holtzman ink blots.

Undergraduate psychology-

major experimenters administered the task to introductory psychologystudent subjects.

One group of experimenters formulated their own expect

ancies about the number of responses the subjects would give to the
stimulus cards.
trinated.

The members of the second group were differentially indoc

Some were led to expect many responses while others were led

to expect few responses.

The experimenters tended to get the results

they expected, even when the expectancy was self induced as with the first
group of experimenters.

The authors concluded that "Bias (was) found to

be an especially strong phenomenon" (p. 253).

Strauss (1968), however,

found no significant experimenter bias effect in the Rorschach ink-blot
task.

Strauss stated that "E (experimenter) expectance does not appear

to affect a centrally significant Rorschach variable in a personality
assessment situation" (p. 129).

The variable in question was movement
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domination or color domination of the movement to color ratios in the
responses.

The crucial difference between the Strauss study and the

preceding two was that Strauss attempted to approximate a "real-life"
assessment situation.

The graduate student experimenters had completed

a full course in projective techniques.

The experimenter expectancies

were not specifically induced as in the two preceding studies and the
experimenters had different expectancies for different subjects.

One

must conclude that while the ink-blot projective tests can be readily
used to demonstrate the experimenter bias effect, the effect is probably
less powerful, less general in actual personality-assessment situations.
Shames and Adair (1967) studied the effect of type of task on
the experimenter bias effect.

The first task was the person-perception

problem and the second, a more fact-oriented task, involved estimating
the number of dots on a card.

The person-perception task was a repli

cation of the basic Rosenthal paradigm.

Some of the student experimenters

were led to expect judgments of success (+5) from their student subjects,
and the rest were led to expect judgments of failure (-5).

The experi

menters were led to believe that they were replicating "well-established
findings."

The numerosity estimation task required the subjects to

estimate how many dots were on each of 10 stimulus cards.
cards contained 200 dots.

The individual

One group of experimenters expected over

estimates (average 210 rating) and the second group expected under
estimates (average 190 rating).

A significant experimenter bias effect

was found on the person-perception task, but not on the less ambiguous
numerosity estimation task.
Weiss (1967, 1969) attempted to vary task ambiguity by varying
tachistoscopic exposure time of 15 slides containing differing numbers
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of dots (7 to 10 per slide).

For high ambiguity the exposure time was

•1 second, for moderate ambiguity .5 second, and for low ambiguity 5
seconds.

The volunteer student experimenters were divided into three

groups and given different expectancies.

One group expected the sub

jects to underestimate, the second group expected average estimates,
and the third group expected overestimates.

A basic problem found was

that all subjects underestimated the number of dots when the exposure
time was shortest, .1 second.

No firm conclusions can be drawn from

the studies.
Wessler (1968, 1969; Wessler & Strauss, 1968) explored the
relationship of the experimenter bias effect to various types of tasks.
In general, no strong experimenter bias effect was found in any of the
tasks studied.
perception task.

One of the tasks was the original Rosenthal personIn two attempts to replicate the original findings no

significant experimenter bias effect was found.

In the first attempt

the results were in the opposite direction from what was expected; in
the second, the results were in the predicted direction but not statis
tically significant.

No significant experimenter bias effect was

found in a reaction time study either.

The reaction time task would

be considered a task-ability situation (Riecken, 1962).

In a compar

ative study of three different tasks, person-perception, judging of
line lengths, and the tapping of dots into circles, no overall signif
icant experimenter bias effect was found.
the basis of decreasing ambiguity.

The tasks were selected on

The person-perception task was

thought to be most ambiguous, the judging of line lengths of moderate
ambiguity, and the dot tapping task of least ambiguity.

While no overall

significant bias effect was found on any of the tasks, subjects showing
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bias in the predicted direction on the most ambiguous task, the personperception task, were significantly biased on the moderately ambiguous
task but not significantly biased on the least ambiguous task, Wessler
concluded that "These trends are congruent with the hypothesis that the
more obvious the correct response is to

(subject), the less suscep

tible S_'s (subject's) performance is to _E (experimenter) expectancy
effects, probably because

need not seek information about how his per

formance will be evaluated by 12 " (1969, p. 66).
Masling and Rabie (Masling, 1966) studied the effect of varying
the ambiguity of the stimulus items within a person-perception situation.
From a pool of 70 high school class pictures two sets of seven pictures
were chosen to serve as the stimulus items.

The pictures were selected

on the basis of perceived attractiveness as judged by female subjects.
While the two groups of pictures had the same mean attractiveness, they
varied considerably in homogeneity.

One group was fairly homogeneous;

the pilot subjects were in fairly good agreement about the degree of
attractiveness displayed.

The second group of pictures showed much more

variability in judged attractiveness.

The low variability photos were

less ambiguous than the high variability set of photos.

The experi

menters were told that the task was designed to study the relationship
between the self-concept of freshman female subjects with the ratings
of attractiveness the subjects would assign to the photos.

Half of the

experimenters were told that their subjects were high in self-concept,
would show good acceptance of others, and therefore tend to give high
attractiveness ratings.

The other half of the experimenters, a control

group, were given no expectancies.

The experimental hypothesis was that

the subjects in the experimental group would show a significant
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difference between the two sets of stimulus items; the more ambiguous
items would show biased ratings, be rated more attractive.
group would show no significant difference.

The control

The results of the study

were in the predicted direction but did not attain statistical signif
icance.

Recapitulation
Several studies involving animal subjects (Brogden, 1962;
Cordaro & Ison, 1963; Ingraham & Harrington, 1966; Rosenthal & Halas,
1962; Shinkman & Kornblith, 1965) have presented evidence that an
experimenter's or observer's familiarity with a task is a factor in his
performance.

The general tenor of the conclusions was that less experi

enced researchers were more likely to bias their results in animal
studies.

Very little research has been done on the role of the experi

menter's experience involving the person perception task.

Vikan-Kline

(1962) and Rosenthal (1966) suggested that more experienced experimenters
are more likely to display a bias effect on the person perception task.
The general conclusion about a subject's performance relative
to his experience seems to be that as a subject becomes more familiar
with a particular task he tends to be less affected by the experimenter's
expectancy.

This tentative conclusion was supported by research con

ducted by Rosenthal, Fode, Vikan-Kline, and Persinger (1964) and Weick
(Rosenthal, 1966).
Several authors have suggested that inter-task ambiguity is an
important factor in the experimenter bias effect (Masling, 1966; Weis,
1967, 1969; Wessler, 1968, 1969; Shames & Adair, 1967; Wessler & Strauss,
1968).

Only one of the authors, Masling (1966) attempted to vary
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inter-task ambiguity within the person perception task; the results
were inconclusive.

Statement of the Problem
This study will investigate the role of inter-task ambiguity
and intra-task ambiguity in the experimenter bias effect.

Past studies

have suggested that task ambiguity is a crucial factor limiting the
generality of the experimenter bias effect.

Past studies have also

suggested the importance of intra-task ambiguity.

As experimenters

and subjects become more familiar with a task their responses change;
previous studies have led to tentative conclusions about these changes.

Hypotheses
1.

The experimenter bias effect is a function of inter-task
ambiguity.

2.

The experimenter bias effect is a function of intra-task
ambiguity.
a.

The experimenter bias effect decreases as a function
of the subjects' increasing familiarity with a partic
ular task.

b.

The experimenter bias effect increases as a function
of the experimenters' increasing familiarity with a
particular task.

CHAPTER III

METHOD

The Stimulus Photos

Two groups of 10 photos selected from an initial pool of 63 were
used in this study.

The initial pool of photos, taken from weekly news

magazines, included both known and relatively unknown persons.

In the

eyes of the author, the initial pool of photos sampled all points of
the success-failure dimension in terms of facial expression, reputation,
clothing, and pictured background.
'
The initial pool of 63 photos were shown by the author to 27
female volunteers from the introduction to psychology class in individ
ual sessions under a no-expectancy condition.

The pilot study subjects

were asked to rate the photos on a 20-point scale (-10, extreme failure,
to +10, extreme success, with no 0 point) as to the degree of success or
failure that the pictured person was experiencing.

To insure against

expectancy communication between the author and the pilot subjects, the
author avoided looking at which particular photo the subject was view
ing and recorded results by noting a randomly assigned identification
number on the back of the photo.

The pilot photos were shuffled

between subjects to avoid serial effects.
The two groups of 10 photos selected for use in the study were
chosen on the basis of the no-expectancy mean ratings.

The photos

selected for the high ambiguity group had mean ratings near 0, the
24
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neutral point.

Ratings of success-failure for these tended to vary

symmetrically about the mean rating.

Photos selected for the low

ambiguity group were those with the highest mean ratings.

The ratings

of these high success photos were less free to vary due to the +10
ceiling for ratings.

It was thought that the highly rated photos would

be a problem more of recognition that attitude for raters while the
photos rated near the neutral point would represent more of an attitudeoriented problem.

The highly rated photos tended to be relatively well

known persons such as Nixon, Dustin Hoffman, Johnny Carson, and Dick
Cavett; the high ambiguity group tended to be relative unknowns.

A sec

ond difference between the groups was that the persons pictured in the
low ambiguity photos tended to have more "smiley" expressions; the pic
tures with means near the neutral point, in the eyes of the author, had
expressions that were much more enigmatic.
The mean ratings and standard deviation of the photos are con
tained in Table 11 of Appendix B.

As can be seen from the table, the

photos selected for the more ambiguous set had mean ratings of from -.9
to +.9 while the mean ratings of photos selected for the relatively
unambiguous set ranged from +6.1 to +8.2.

The SDs for the ambiguous

photos tended to be larger than the SDs for the unambiguous photos.
The mean SI) for the ambiguous photos was 4.29 and the mean HD for the
unambiguous photos was 3.16.
The selected photos were mounted on 8 x 7 inch tabbed pieces of
cardboard and placed in individual slots in an accordian-type expanding
folder.

The pictures were randomly ordered to guard against having all

the ambiguous photos in a group and all of the unambiguous photos in
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another group,

better identifications were written on the tabbed portions

of the cards.

Experimenters
The experimenters were nine male volunteers from the abnormal
psychology class.

All nine were psychology majors in their junior or

senior year of study.

In soliciting for volunteers, the author stated

that the study involved research on "empathy."

The volunteers would get

actual research experience as research assistants.

As a further induce

ment to volunteer, the students were told that if the research turned
out well, it would be published with the volunteer research assistants'
names in a footnote.

The students that volunteered were asked to wear

coat and tie for the actual study.

Subjects
The subjects were 90 female volunteers from the introduction to
psychology class.
tors.

Volunteers were solicited through recitation instruc

Women students were asked to volunteer for a "picture" study that

would take only 10-15 minut .■•> of their time.

They were asked to sign up

for one of nine experimental sessions scheduled an hour and a half apart
(6:30, 8:00, and 9:30) on three succeeding evenings.

It was found to

be quite difficult to get volunteers for the 9:30 sessions.

The author

had to call students personally to get enough volunteers for that time
slot.

Each volunteer was called shortly before her schedule time to

remind her of when and where the study was scheduled.

Procedure
The nine student experimenters were randomly assigned to one of
three bias conditions, low bias (expect -5 mean ratings), neutral bias
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(expect 0 mean ratings), and high bias (expect +5 mean ratings).

Three

experimenters, one from each bias condition, were scheduled to test indi
vidually 10 subjects each night of the study.

The three experimenters

from each bias condition were scheduled in different time slots over the
three nights of the study.

The experimenters were scheduled 90 minutes

apart so that there was no overlap between groups; each experimenter took
about 45 minutes to test his 10 subjects.
The experimenters were read standardized instructions by the
author before their testing sessions.

The instructions were as follows:

You have been asked to assist me in a research project developing a
test of empathy.

I am using different experimenters and subjects to

approximate real test situations.

Your task will consist of showing a

series of photos of persons to about 10 female subjects from the intro
duction to psychology class and asking them to rate the photos as to the
degree of success or failure that the pictured person has been experiencing.
The subjects differ rather markedly on tested anxiety level and on tested
self-confidence.

These basic personality differences are hypothesized to

relate to how empathetic the person is— how well he is able to identify
with others.

For example, highly anxious-low self-confidence subjects

will tend to be generally pessimistic and tend to rate others as experi
encing relative failure.

Low anxiety-high self-confidence subjects are

thought to generally view others in a more favorable light and consequently
tend to give ratings of relative success.

The pictures are to be shown

to the subjects in pre-arranged random orders as indicated on the subjects'
rating sheets.
explanatory.

The instructions you are to read to the subjects are selfTry to put the subjects at ease while reading the instruc

tions and going over the information at the top of the rating sheet.

If
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everything is working as expected your subjects should give average rat
ings of about (+5, -5, 0).

Please do not discuss this project with any

one until all the subjects are run which will be by this weekend.

If

it gets around what the study is all about, it may contaminate the results.
The only difference in the instructions read was the figure given
for the average rating expected.

The number read to the student experi

menter was in accordance with which bias condition he represented.
The 10 subjects seen by each experimenter were randomly divided
into two groups.

Five subjects were shown only the 10 high ambiguity

photos and 5 subjects were shown only the 10 low ambiguity photos.

Each

experimenter tested his 10 subjects in a prearranged random order and
the 10 photos each subject rated were presented in a prearranged random
order.
All testing was done in the same one-way mirror observational
room.

The subjects were met in a waiting room across the hall from the

testing room and ushered into the testing room one at a time by the chief
investigator.

The testing room contained a chair on each side of a small

table on which was placed the mounted photos in their container.

A copy

of the rating scale to be used was in constant view so that the subjects
could refer to it during the course of their testing.

A copy of this

rating scale, based on one used by Rosenthal (1966), is contained in
Appendix A.
The instructions read to the subjects by the experimenters were
also based on those used by Rosenthal (1966).
am going to read you some instructions.

They were as follows:

I

I am not permitted to say any

thing which is not in the instructions nor can I answer any questions
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about this experiment.
of empathy.

OK?

We are in the process of developing a test

This test is designed to show how well a person is able to

put himself into someone else's place.
photographs.

I will show you a series of

For each one I want you to judge whether the person pictured

has been experiencing success or failure.

To help you make more exact

judgments you are to use this rating scale.
runs from -10 to +10.

As you can see the scale

A rating of -10 means that you judge the person

to have experienced extreme failure.

A rating of +10 means that you

judge the person to have experienced extreme success.

A rating of -1

means that you judge the person to have experienced mild failure, while
a rating of +1 means that you judge the person to have experienced mild
success.

You are to rate each photo as accurately as you can.

Just

tell me the rating you assign to each photo in numerical terms— for
example, -10, +10, +3 or -3.

All ready?

Here is the first photo.

Each subject carried into the testing room a rating sheet which
indicated the pictures the experimenter was to present and a place for
the experimenter to record the ratings given.

The upper part of the

rating sheet asked for routine information such as name, age, major,
recitation number and instructor, and year in school.

These questions

were answered in the waiting room before the subjects were ushered into
the testing room.
The experimenters were instructed to not remove the photos com
pletely from their slots.

This speeded up the task as it was faster to

merely drop the photo back into its slot and it kept the experimenters
from seeing what picture they were presenting.

With the card only partly

removed from its slot, all the experimenter could see from his side of
the table was the identifying letter on the back of the mounted photo.
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After testing, the subjects returned to the waiting room and
were asked to fill-out a short questionnaire.
the following questions:
the experimenter?

The questionnaire asked

(1) How would you describe the attitude of

(Cold, Warm, Distant, Calm, Hurried, etc.)

do you think was the real purpose of this study?

(2) What

(3) What do you think

was the average rating expected by your experimenter on a scale -10
(extreme failure) to +10 (extreme success)?

At the bottom of the ques

tionnaire was an admonition to not discuss the study with others who
might take part in it.
A confederate of the author was stationed behind the one-way
mirror at the start of the study to check on the accuracy of the stu
dent experimenters in recording their ratings.

The assistant stationed

behind the mirror found that it was very difficult to hear the ratings.
As a result, the information that he recorded may have been less accu
rate than the ratings as recorded by the student experimenter.

On the

second evening of the study a concealed microphone was tried but still
the ratings were very difficult to hear behind the one-way mirror.
Rather than move the microphone nearer to the experimenter and the
subject, making it obvious that they were being observed, it was
thought best to discontinue this aspect of the study.

CHAPTER IV

RESULTS

The raw data are contained in Tables 12, 13, and 14 in Appendix
B.

A constant of 10 was added to each rating to convert all ratings to

positive values for the data analysis.
The first analysis of variance computed was a 3 x 3 x 2 with the
second factor, experimenters, nested under the first factor, bias con
dition.

The third factor was ambiguity level, the set of photos used

to elicit the ratings.

The dependent variable in this analysis was

the mean ratings given by the subjects; there were five subjects in
each of 18 cells.
in Table 1.

The cell means and standard deviations are contained

The analysis was carried out using procedures described

by Winer (1962, pp. 258-263).

This overall analysis of the data is

contained in Table 2.
Two preliminary checks on the data were performed to assess
the tenability of the assumptions underlying the analysis of variance
model.

To test for homogeneity of variance, a Cochran's JC statistic

was computed.

The observed

was .132 with a C of .192 required to

reject the hypothesis of variance equality at the .05 level where _k,
the number of cells, is equal to 20.

To test whether a data trans

formation was advisable, a Pearson Product-Moment Correlation Coefficient,
_r, was computed between the cell means and associated cell variances.
The resulting r_, -.273, was not significant.
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TABLE 1
SUMMARY OF THE MEAN RATINGS

Bias

Ambiguous Photos

E

Unambiguous Photos

M

10.22

15.02

SD

.65

2.01

M

10.50

13.86

SD

.38

2.18

M

10.74

15.30

SD

3.03

1.77

M

8.92

12.70

SD

2.66

2.21

M

9.78

15.12

SD

2.78

1.51

M

9.18

13.66

SD

1.92

1.58

M

11.74

14.90

SD

1.83

1.04

M

12.60

13.68

SD

2.04

2.36

M

10.54

14.24

SD

1.61

1.72

3

Low

4

8

2

Medium

6

7

1

High

5

9
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TABLE 2
OVERALL ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE BASED ON THE SUBJECTS' MEAN RATING

P

F

Bias

2

15.73

Es within Biases*

6

3.69

Ambiguity

1

326.05

87.41

<.01

Bias x Ambiguity

2

7.72

2.07

NS

Es w. Biases x Ambiguity*

6

2.60

Within Cell*

72

3.82

Pooled Error

84

3.73

4.22

O

MS

A

df_

Source

Note.— After preliminary checks at the .10 level of signifi
cance, the starred sources of variance were pooled into a common
error term.

As can be seen in Table 2, the bias effect was significant beyond
the .05 level and the ambiguity effect was significant beyond the .01
level.

The interaction of ambiguity and bias, which would show the dif

ferential effect of bias on low and high ambiguity photos, was not sig
nificant.

Internal analysis of the data showed that there was a sig

nificant difference between the high bias mean (12.95) and the medium
bias mean (11.56).

The observed jt was 2.80; with 84 degrees of free

dom, the probability of this Jt occurring by chance is less than .005.
The difference between the low bias mean (12.60) and the medium bias
mean (11.56) was also significant.

The probability of a t this large

with 84 degrees of freedom is less than .025.

The difference between
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the high bias mean and the low bias mean was not statistically signifi
cant (jt = .704) .
The second general part of the analysis of the data consisted
of two 3 x 5
intra-task

analyses with one repeated measure, designed to get at
ambiguity from the experimenters' point of view and the

detailed relationship of task ambiguity and bias.

The same data used

in the overall analysis of variance above, the subjects’ mean ratings,
were used in this part of the data analysis but the data were split
into two parts.

The mean ratings from the subjects who were asked to

rate the ambiguous photos were analyzed separately from the mean rat
ings of the subjects who rated the unambiguous photos.
For these analyses of variance the mean ratings were ordered
in the sequence in which the subjects were tested by the experimenters
The repeated factor was the subject order and the nonrepeated factor
was the bias condition.

The data were analyzed following procedures

described by Winer (1962, pp. 302-307).

The cell means and standard

deviations are contained in Tables 3 and 4.
graphically in Figures 1 and 2.

The data are presented

Summaries of these analyses of vari

ance are contained in Tables 5 and 6.
As can be seen in Table 5 and Figure 1, the mean ratings of
the ambiguous photos did not show a significant experimenter bias
effect.

The order effect was significant beyond the .05 level.

Figure 1 shows that this significant subject order effect reflects
a general decline in the mean ratings given by the later seen sub
jects .
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TABLE 3
SUMMARY OF THE MEAN RATINGS OF THE UNAMBIGUOUS PHOTOS

Subject Order
3

4

5

15.46

14.10

12.96

2.43

.83

1.47

1.78

14.46

12.66

15.23

14.20

12.56

SD

1.35

1.26

2.08

.60

3.23

M

14.86

15.13

14.93

13.30

13.13

SD

1.75

.30

1.76

1.60

2.54

1

2

M

16.36

14.73

SD

2.15

M

Bias

Low

Medium

High

TABLE 4
SUMMARY OF THE MEAN RATINGS OF THE AMBIGUOUS PHOTOS
Subject Order
3

4

5

9.46

9.60

9.96

2.34

1.81

.36

.90

10.23

9.90

9.16

9.23

7.93

SD

1.14

1.34

3.13

3.96

2.13

M

13.06

11.73

9.83

12.33

11.16

SD

.45

1.50

.77

2.57

2.60

1

2

M

11.77

11.63

SD

1.59

M

Bias

Low

Medium

High

•----------- . HIGH BIAS
----------- * MEDIUM BIAS
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"

*----------- LOW BIAS

m
>

2

§

LO

2
O

T"
I

i

4

3

2
SUBJECT

ORDER

5

MEAN

RATING
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TABLE 5
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF THE MEAN RATINGS OF THE UNAMBIGUOUS PHOTOS

Source

df

MS

F

P

Between
Bias

2

3.04

JEs within Biases

6

3.96

Subject Order

4

8.74

Bias x Order*

8

1.76

Bias x Es within Biases*

24

3.25

Pooled Error

32

2.87

.767

NS

Within
3.05
.541

<.05
NS

Note.— After preliminary checks at the .10 significance level,
the starred sources of variance were pooled into a common error term.
TABLE 6
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF THE MEAN RATINGS OF THE AMBIGUOUS PHOTOS

Source

df

MS

F

P

Between
Bias

2

20.42

Es within Biases

6

2. 22

Subject Order

4

7.75

Bias x Order*

8

1.44

Bias x Es within Biases*

24

4.61

Pooled Error

32

3.82

9.19

<.025

Within
1.68
.310

NS
NS

Note;— After preliminary checks at the .10 significance level,
the starred sources of variance were pooled into a common error term.
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Table 6 and Figure 2, based on mean ratings given by subjects
who viewed the ambiguous photos, reflect a significant experimenter
bias effect; the subject order effect was not significant.
of the bias levels is not as predicted, hoxi?ever.

The order

As can be seen in

Figure 2, the low bias mean ratings are between the high bias mean
ratings and the neutral or medium bias mean ratings rather than lower
than the medium bias mean ratings.
The third general part of the data analysis was an examination
of the relationship of bias to intra-task
view of the subjects.

ambiguity from the point of

This data analysis involved two 3 x 10 analyses

with the second factor a repeated measure.

The second factor repre

sented the individual ratings of the 10 photos rated by each subject
in the order presented.

The first factor was the three levels of bias.

The data, as in the second general part of the data analysis, was
split into two groups.

The data from the subjects who rated the

unambiguous photos were analyzed separately from the data from the
subjects who rated the ambiguous photos.
deviations are given in Tables 7 and 8.

The cell means and standard
These analyses of variance

are summarized in Tables 9 and 10 and the data are presented graphic
ally in Figures 3 and 4.
From the numerical analysis of the data from the unambiguous
photos, contained in Table 9, one can see that there is a significant
bias x picture order interaction but also a significant picture order
main effect.
.870.

The bias main effect was not significant; the IT was only

The graphic presentation of this data, contained in Figure 3,

shows that while there is much crossover of the lines representing the

42

TABLE 7
SUMMARY OF THE INDIVIDUAL ORDERED RATINGS OF THE UNAMBIGUOUS PHOTOS

1

Bias

M

2

3

Picture Order
4
5
6

7

8

9

10

16.73 15.13 15.00 14.47 15.73 14.60 14.13 14.23 13.53 13.73

Low
SD

M

2.58

3.66

4.16

4.58

2.40

4.98

3.81

3.41

3.93

5.22

13.93 13.13 14.60 14.87 13.33 15.60 13.60 14.33 11.40 13.47

Medium
SD

M

5.30

5.07

3.83

3.40

4.32

5.01

3.52

2.99

5.05

3.38

16.07 15.73 15.80 17.13 14.40 11.87 11.87 13.47 12.87 13.53

High
SD

3.28

3.61

3.34

2.39

2.82

4.32

4.85

5.28

4.31

3.23

TABLE 8
SUMMARY OF THE INDIVIDUAL ORDERED RATINGS OF THE AMBIGUOUS PHOTOS

1

Bias
M

2

3

Picture Order
4
5
6

7

8

9

10

9.13 10.73 10.87

8.93

9.67 10.67 11.00 12.07

8.33 13.27

4.56

6.22

5.61

4.65

5.65

4.48

9.13 10.13

8.40

7.60

9.47

8.33 10.93

3.98

5.45

4.44

6.75

6.23

Low
SD
M

3.23

2.83

4.88

3.13

7.60 10.07 11.27

Medium
SD

M

5.25

11.87 12.13 11.00 10.73 10.80

6.20

5.15

5.98

6.80

9.93 13.20 12.60 12.47 11.53

High
SD

4.53

4.10

3.76

3.95

5.12

3.79

3.95

4.50

4.03

5.30
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TABLE 9
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF THE ORDERED INDIVIDUAL RATINGS OF THE
UNAMBIGUOUS PHOTOS
Source

df

MS

F

P

Between
Bias
Ss within Biases

2

30.83

.870

42

35.56

9

43.41

6.00

<.001

18

20.68

2.86

<.001

378

7.24

2.86

NS

Within
Picture Order
Bias x Picture Order
Bias x Ss within Biases

TABLE 10
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF THE ORDERED INDIVIDUAL RATINGS OF THE
AMBIGUOUS PHOTOS

Source

df

MS

F

P

Between
Bias

2

204.17

42

39.75

9

5.14

<.025

37.51

1.68

<.10

18

18.63

.83

NS_

Bias x Ss within Biases*

378

22.51

Pooled Error

396

22.32

Subjects within Biases
Within
Picture Order
Bias x Picture Order*

Note.— After a preliminary check at the .10 level of significance,
the starred variance sources were pooled into a common error term.

I

2

3

4

5
PICTURE

6

7
ORDER

8

9

10

I

2

3

4

5
PICTURE

6

7

ORDER

8

9

10
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three bias conditions, the general trend of the data is clearly toward
lower ratings for later rated photos.
The analysis of the ordered ratings of the ambiguous photos,
contained in Table 10, showed a significant experimenter bias effect
(jP less than .025) and a picture order effect that approaches sig
nificance Q? less than .10).

The bias x picture order interaction

was not statistically significant although the graphic presentation
of the data, Figure 4, shows some crossover of the lines representing
the three bias conditions.

Figure 4 also shows that the ratings

elicited by the low bias experimenters tended to be intermediate
between the ratings elicited by the high and medium bias experimen
ters.

The ratings elicited by the high and medium bias experimenters

tend to be in the predicted order.

CHAPTER V

DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS

Inter-task Ambiguity

The first experimental hypothesis, that the experimenter bias
effect is a function of inter-task ambiguity, is supported by the data.
In both cases where the data from the ambiguous photos were analyzed
separately from the unambiguous photo ratings, a significant experi
menter bias effect was found with the ambiguous photos and not found
with the unambiguous photos.

However, this effect was small since the

interaction reported in Table 2 was not significant.

The magnitude

of the j? statistic for the ambiguity effect was extremely high, 87.41,
indicating the great difference between the low ambiguity and the high
ambiguity data.
While the data indicated a statistically significant experi
menter bias effect, a closer examination of the data indicated that
the ratings were not in the magnitude order predicted from the experi
menters' expectancies.

The ratings given by the subjects tested by

the low expectancy experimenters were generally higher than the ratings
given by the subjects tested by the medium expectancy experimenters.
This is clearly shown in Figures 2 and 4.

The internal analysis of

the overall analysis of variance reported in Table 2 also showed this
unpredicted order.

The high expectancy and low expectancy means, while

not significantly different from each other, were both significantly
49
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larger than the intermediate expectancy mean.

A possible explanation

of this unexpected order is that the task may not have been believable
to the low expectancy experimenters.

The mean overall rating of the

20 photos was about +3 during the no-expectancy standardization ses
sions.

It may be more believable to an experimenter to be told to

expect a mean rating of +5 or 0 on these photos than to expect a mean
rating of -5.

An expected mean rating of -5 is just not plausible

when all of the photos are rated without preconceptions.

A second

group of low ambiguity photos, selected from the extreme low success
photos, might have had a balancing effect and made the task more
plausible to the low expectancy experimenters.
There is some evidence against the above explanation of the
unpredicted rating order.

Figure 2, the graphic presentation of the

mean ratings of the high ambiguity photos, shows that the unpredicted
order of the,mean ratings was evident with very early subjects as well
as with later seen subjects.

Generally, according to the observers

stationed behind the one-way mirror, the experimenters did not look at
the photos before testing the early subjects.

Some experimenters did

look at all of the photos, but only after testing some of their sub
jects.

The anomalous order of the mean ratings, then, was probably a

function of something brought to the testing situation by the experi
menters or subjects and not acquired during the testing.
A second possible, but improbable, explanation for the rating
order is a breakdown in the randomization procedures.

It is possible

that the experimenters randomly selected to be low expectancy experimen
ters were different in some way from the other six experimenters.
some unknown reason they did not communicate their expectancies.

For
A
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strictly random process (drawing names) was followed in assigning the
experimenters to the bias conditions.

It is very unlikely that there

was any systematic difference between the experimenters introduced as
a result of the random assignment of the experimenters.

Importance of the Bias Effect
While the experimenter bias effect was found to be statistically
significant in this study, the amount of variability attributable to the
bias effect was quite small.

The variability attributable to the bias

effect ranged from 1.2% in the data analysis summarized in Table 9 (the
bias effect was not statistically significant in that analysis) to a
high of 24.5% in Table 6, the analysis of the mean ratings of the
ambiguous photos.

According to Rosenthal (1969b), with a sample size

of about 50 and a median

value of .10, expectancy effects, on the

average, account for only about 5% of the total variance.

The median

variability accounted for by the experimenter bias effect in this study
was 4.0%; this value came from the data summarized in Table 5.

The

amounts of variability attributable to bias were 3.8% for the data in
Table 10 and 4.8% for Table 2.

Rosenthal stated that these small

effects are still worth worrying about, however, "because that (5%)
may be about the average magnitude of variance accounted for in much
or most behavioral prediction" (1969b, p. 14).
One can question the importance of an effect that typically
accounts for only about 5% of the total variance.

There are many expe

rimenters, however, where 5% of the variance can make the difference
between one conclusion and another.

Psychologists currently seem to

have a penchant for arbitrary points for statistical significance,
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e.g., .01.

When one holds strongly to some arbitrary level of signifi

cance for decision making, 5% of the variance can be very important.

Intra-task Ambiguity
The second experimental hypothesis was not supported by the
data.

Where a significant experimenter bias effect was found, it did

not seem to be differentially related to the experimenters' or the
subjects' familiarity with the task.
The prediction that the experimenters' increasing familiarity
with the task would lead to more efficient bias communication with
later seen subjects was not confirmed by the data.

Figure 2, the

ordered mean ratings of the ambiguous photos, indicates that early
subject performance is about the same as late subject performance.
The bias effect was not minimal with early subjects and maximal with
late subjects but maximal with early and late subjects and minimal
with the intermediate subjects.

The experimenters' experience was

not a relevant variable in this study.
The subject's performance over the course of the task (Figure
4) appeared to be relatively independent of their familiarity with
the task.

The prediction that the subjects' ratings would become more

independent of the experimenters' biases with increasing familiarity
with the task was not supported by the data.

The findings of Weick

(Rosenthal, 1966) and Rosenthal et al., (1964) were not corroborated
by this study.

The data pertaining to the subjects' performance over

the course of the 10 photos each rated showed great variability; this
made it difficult to state any clear conclusions.
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The ratings of the unambiguous photos, while not showing a
significant experimenter bias effect, showed a relationship between
the subjects' and experimenters' familiarity with the task and the
ratings given.

Both analyses of variance that were based on the rat

ings of the unambiguous photos, summarized in Tables 5 and 9, showed
a significant order effect.

The analysis summarized in Table 9 also

showed a significant bias x picture order interaction, however.

The

graphic presentation of the data, Figures 1 and 3, show clearly that
the general trend of the data is toward lower ratings with increasing
familiarity both from the experimenters' point of view, Figure 1, and
the subjects' point of view, Figure 3.

The early ratings depicted in

Figures 1 and 3 were not much different from the mean ratings under the
no-expectancy standardization condition.

In Figure 1 the mean rating

of the first subjects was 15.27; the mean rating of the last seen sub
jects was 12.88.

In Figure 3 the mean rating of the first photo was

15.58, of the last photo, 13.58.
The trends were probably artifactual and not dependent upon
familiarity or decreasing ambiguity.

One possible reason why the later

tested subjects rated lower on the unambiguous photos was that they had
to wait longer before their testing sessions.

When drawing for subject

order in the presence of the subjects, the author observed that subjects
who did not have to wait, the early drawn ones, were quite happy.

They

were getting experimental credit for a relatively short time investment.
The task may have been more negative for subjects who had to wait for up
to 45 minutes to be tested.

This possible growing impatience with the

whole situation could conceivably have lead to later lower ratings.
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The ratings of the ambiguous photos in relation to subject
order, Table 6, Figure 2, also showed some tendency for longer-wait
subjects to rate lower.

The first-subject mean was 11.68 while the

fifth-subject mean was 9.68.

The tendency toward lowered later sub

ject ratings was not as strong as with the unambiguous photos.

The

order effect, Table 6, was not statistically significant (P_ less than
.25) as it had been with the unambiguous photos CP less than .05),
Table 5.
The trends of the ratings ordered by picture order, Figures 3
and 4, were quite different from the trends of the ratings ordered by
subject order, Figures 1 and 2.

Where the subject-ordered ratings show

a roughly parallel decline, the picture-ordered ratings of the unambig
uous and ambiguous photos show a tendency toward convergence.

The

picture-ordered ratings of the unambiguous photos had a mean of 15.58
for the first photo and 13.58 for the tenth photo so there was a tend
ency for later pictures to be rated lower than earlier pictures as
stated earlier.

The order effect was significant (F=6.00, P_ less than

.001) but also the bias x picture order interaction (F=2.86, P_ less than
.001) as Table 9 indicates.

The picture ordered ratings of the ambig

uous photos (Figure 4) had a mean of 10.04 for the first photo and 12.02
for the tenth photo; the general trend of the ratings seems to be toward
higher ratings for later rated photos.

The picture-order effect for the

ambiguous photos approached but did not achieve statistical significance
(F=1.70, 1? less than .10) as indicated by Table 10.
What appears to have happened is that the subjects over the
course of the 10 photos each rated retreated to ratings of higher social
desirability.

For the unambiguous photos the subjects started rating
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high, as expected, but retreated to lower ratings later.

The ambiguous

photos were initially rated as being not successful and not unsuccessful
as in the no-expectancy situation; they tended to be rated as mildly
successful later.

While it is probably very acceptable to say someone

is mildly successful, it is somewhat less acceptable to say someone is
very successful or not successful and not unsuccessful.

Objectively,

the photos probably would have to be rated more as the subjects did on
the first photos they rated.

CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Previous research and discussion has suggested that task ambigu
ity and experimenter-subject familiarity with the task are important
factors affecting the generality and strength of the experimenter bias
effect.

These factors were conceptualized as inter-task ambiguity

(inherent in the task) and two types of intra-task ambiguity (experi
menter's familiarity with the task and subject's familiarity with the
task).

It was hypothesized that experimenter bias would:

(1) be a

significant factor in a more ambiguous task and not a significant factor
in a less ambiguous task, (2) more likely be communicated to the sub
jects who were less familiar with the task, and (3) more likely be com
municated to the subjects as the experimenters became more familiar
with the task.
Nine upperclassmen experimenters were randomly assigned to one
of three bias level, high, medium, and low (expect +5, 0, or -5 mean
ratings on the person perception task).

Each experimenter tested 10

subjects (female volunteers from introductory psychology) in a random
order.

Five subjects rated high ambiguity photos (mean ratings near

0 on the success-failure dimension under a no-expectancy condition)
and five viewed low ambiguity photos (mean ratings high in the success
direction under the no-expectancy condition).
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Five analyses of variance were computed; a significant experi
menter bias effect was found with the high ambiguity stimulus photos
but not with the low ambiguity photos.
not communicated in the predicted order.

However, the bias levels were
The high and low expectancy

experimenters were both significantly higher than the medium bias experi
menters.

The hypotheses pertaining to intra-task ambiguity were not

supported by the data.
From this study one can conclude that the experimenter bias
effect is a function of ambiguity inherent in the task.

The role of

intra-task ambiguity is less clear and no conclusion can be stated
based on the present data.

Extreme
Failure
-10 -9

-8

Moderate
Failure
-7 -6 -5 -4

Mild
Failure
-3
-2 -1

Mild
Success
+1 +2 +3

+4

Moderate
Success
+5 +6 +7

+8

Extreme
Success
+9 +10
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TABLE 11
MEAN RATINGS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF THE PHOTOS
UNDER THE NO-EXPECTANCY CONDITION

High Ambiguity Photos
SD
M

Low Ambiguity Photos
M
SD

+.4

4.6

+6.9

1.8

-.7

3.8

+6.1

4.0

-.6

3.2

+6.3

5.1

-.6

3.9

+7.2

2.5

-.9

4.8

+6.1

3.6

+ .4

4.2

+7.5

2.0

+• 8

4.5

+6.3

4.8

+ .9

5.0

+6.1

3.9

-.8

4.3

+7.6

2.2

0

4.6

+8.2

1.7

62

TABLE 12
RAW SCORES FOR THE LOW EXPECTANCY EXPERIMENTERS

E

3

.S

1

Ambiguous Photos
Photo Order
2 3 4 5 6 7 8

1

6

9 14 11 11 19 11 16

3

7

9 11 14

5

6 17

7
10

4

5

3

0 15 12

8 11 15 13

17 15 19 13 20 20 17 12 20 20

8 18 15

4

14 12 14

8

6 12

6

20 16 17 12 18 18 17 14 12 15

9 16

3 18

8

18 16 19 20 18 15 12

8 14

7

1

12 19 13 14 18 16 11 11 14 11

7

0 13 15

5 13 16

2

8

5

9 16

2

19 20 15 19 14 20 18 20

5 12 17

8 13

3

17

9 15 13

4

13 18

7

8

8

7

17 11

5 18 14

3 18

1

20 18 18 19 16 20 18 15 16 19

9 18 14 15 14 17

2

17 19 14 20 16 19 19 11 11

7

9

8 11 18 13 12 12 14

6 16 15 16 20

8

8

4

9

7 11

3 15

10

9 11

4

1

7

7 17

9

0 13

11 13 18 14

5 20 13 11

8 12 16 12 12

2 19

9 19 14

9 16 15

17 15 19

17

3

9 13

9

6

10

7 14 19

9 18

8 12

5

9

6

3

6

11 14

9 17

7

11 12 13

8

1

2

1 12

5 18 11 18

5

S^

8

5

9

8

14

4

9 10

Unambiguous Photos
Photo Order
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

5

6 16 20 15 13 14 15 11 18
8 14 13 14 16 14 14
7 13 16

8

0

7

8 11

9

9

6 11

4

13 14 18 12 18 15 17 15 19 19

9

9 13

7 14

6

18 15 15 12 12

8

6 12

7

19 13 16 14 12 11 14 11 18 12

5

8 17 13

3

Note.— A constant of 10 was added to each rating.

7 14 11 15 15
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TABLE 13
RAW SCORES FOR THE MEDIUM EXPECTANCY EXPERIMENTERS

E

S^

1
2
2

6

13 12
7

7

6

5 14

4 18 17 18

5 13 17 13 19 11

1

9 10

3

Unambiguous Photos
Photo Order
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

3 13 17 15 15 15 13

8 12

5

4

11

0

5

19 18 16 12

7 20 11

8 12 15 16 20 12 12 11 12

6

13 18

4

6 20

3

8 13 15

8

9 15

0

4

1

2

1

3

0 20

7

9

8

2

9

9

12 16

1 19 16

4

16 14 18 18 17 16 12 17 11 12

5

20 15 15

7 12 16 17 16 15

8 20 11 15 11 20 11 12 18 13

10

9

0

5

8

5 12

1

5

8 14

7

4

2

8

9

4 11 17

1 18 13

3

14

8

6

2

4

6

19 20 18 14 17 20 19 16 16 16

7

14

7 17 14 12 16 13 12 13 16

8

11

9

2

7

1

Ambiguous Photos
Photo Order
2 3 4 5 6 7 8

4 14 19

15 11

3

5

2

5 17

2 11

9

3

0

5 17

2 19

9 16 16 11 14 11 11

3 14 17 12 18 13 20 12 18

8

3 19

2 16 18

10

3

8 17

6 19

5

2 16

1

7

8

7 13 15

9

3

11

8 13 11 14 16 13

7 12

2 14 15

7

17 13 16 13 15 14 16 14

2 14

19

1

4

6

5

6 17 12 12 19

2

3 14

7

5

5 16

6

11 14

6

8

2 15

8

3 12

8

2

1

8 11

8 12

9 17

7

9

3

9

5

3

10

18 17 19 15 12 18 18 14 11 11

8 15 20 20 20 17 15 12 19
8

8 20 20 16 16 13 14 11 12

18 15 13 18 12 15 12 13 11

Note.— A constant of 10 was added to each rating.

7
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TABLE 14
RAW SCORES FOR THE HIGH EXPECTANCY EXPERIMENTERS

E

1

S

1

1

12 13

2

11

6
7

9 13

8 11

8

1

Unambiguous Photos
Photo Order
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

9 10

S.

8 12 16 14 14 12 18

3

13 13 14 18 15

8

5 12 14 12 13

4

19 18 15 20 18

7 18

7 11 12 13

5

5

15 20 20 14 11 19 18 15 12 14

8 13 11 13 14

7

8

14 18 15 18 18 13 11 15 15 13

6 16 17 18

9

17 18 15 20 15 12 14 17 14 15

6

8

5 16

13 11 17 12

7 19

6

9 15 17 12

6 20 12 13
5 13 15

9 17 17 14

1

13 15 12 18

6 12 18 15

9 18

2

20 17

4

14 12 12 15 13 15 11 17

8 16

3

15 18 15 20 13 14 15 15 12 15

1

5

14 17 19 14 14 15 20 19 12 17

20 15 11 11 20 15 17 15 12 15

7

20 12 11 17 12

8

8 20 20 15 13

6
9

7

2

9 13 11 13 12 20 19

8

9 12

8

1

18 12 16

9 13

7 17 14 16

3

5 18 11

7

7 11

2 13

5

8

14 12

9 11

8 13 17

10

9

9

18 19 15

10

5

Ambiguous Photos
Photo Order
2 3 4 5 6 7 8

9

11 14

7

7

9 14

7 11

9 11 11

7

8

4

7

9

7

3

6

2

18 18 18 18 13 20 12 16 20 14

3 18 14

4

17

6 18

8 15

7

5

14 11 20 17 15 11

6 19

9

7 11

8

8 11

6

20 16 15 13 11

7

1

8 11

6

7 13

10

9 11 20

8 18 19 20 15 15

5

8 14 20
5 11

8 20 16

17 12 13 19 11 11 12 14 13

Note.— A constant of 10 was added to each rating.
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